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Abstract 
We assume a population of infinitely-lived households of the economy split into two groups : one with a high 
discount factor (the patient) and one with a low one (the impatient). The environmental quality is deteriorated by 
firm’s polluting emissions. The governmental policy consists in proposing households to vote for a tax aimed at 
environmental maintenance. We study the voting equilibrium at steady states. The resulting equilibrium 
maintenance is the one of the median voter. We show that (i) an increase in total factor productivity may produce 
effects described by the Environmental Kuznets Curve, (ii) an increase in the patience of impatient households 
may foster environmental quality if the median voter is impatient and maintenance positive, (iii) a decrease in 
inequality among the patient households leads to an increase in environmental quality if the median voter is 
patient and maintenance is positive. We also show that, if the median income is lower than the mean, our model 
predict lower level of environmental quality than the representative agent model, and that increasing public debt 
decreases the level of environmental quality. 
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1 Introduction
With the growing importance of global environmental issues, such as global
warming, and the emphasis put on the general question of sustainable growth
and development, environmental policies and their financing have become a
major subject of concern in many developing or developed countries. As
a response, economic theory, and especially in macro-economics, elaborated
dynamic models based on the representative agent assumption to disentangle
the nexus between economic growth and pollution, or more generally envi-
ronmental quality (see among many others, Gradus and Smulders (1993),
Stokey (1998), or Xepapadeas (2005)). Though, it is striking to notice that
the public debate about environmental policies and their financing very often
focus on the distributive aspects of the policies, and more precisely on the
distribution of their burden among heterogenous agents. To capture that di-
mension, economists must get rid of the representative agent and must start
considering heterogeneous agents in their macrodynamic models. There exist
several ways of introducing heterogeneity, e.g. in wealth (Kempf and Rossig-
nol (2007)), in individual labor productivity (Jouvet et al. (2008)), or in
age with overlapping generations (John and Pecchenino (1994), Jouvet et al.
(2008)).
In this paper we consider heterogeneity in the agents’ discount factor.
1 We assume that the population is exogenously divided into two groups,
one with patient households and the other with impatient households. Each
individual votes in favor, or against a public policy in environmental mainte-
nance. Maintenance is a public policy, financed by a tax on households, and
pollution flows from firm’s activity. We define a voting equilibrium and the
related general equilibrium of the economy at the steady state.
Our setting raises many issues. First, if the policy choice were one-
dimensional, then the median-voter theorem could apply. Unfortunately,
in our dynamic multidimensional setting, it cannot. We will show that, at
the steady state, a voting equilibrium will coincide with the solution that
would result from the median voter theorem. In other words, we provide
a logically consistent definition of the median voter theorem in a dynamic
setting. This establishes the applicability of the median voter theorem on
steady state equilibria. This result is important because, in the literature, it
is always assumed that the median voter theorem can be applied after the
steady state is defined, though the steady state equilibrium itself depends
on the voting equilibrium (see e.g. Kempf and Rossignol (2007), Corbae et
1For a general survey of the literature on models of economic growth with consumers
having different discount factors, see Becker (2006).
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al. (2009)). Our contribution is to prove that a dynamic voting equilibrium
coincides with the application of the median voter theorem. This represents
a contribution to the theoretical literature. Further, to stress the advan-
tages of considering heterogenous agents, we compare our results with what
the representative agent framework would provide. And the results differ in
many respects.
Beyond the theoretical aspects, we also contribute the literature on polit-
ical economy and environmental policy. With some comparative statics, we
are able to show several novel results. We first show that, if the median voter
is impatient, she consumes all her revenue, and maintenance will be zero.
But if the median voter is patient, then maintenance will be positive, but
not uniquely determined. Then we can go further and stress that there exist
two channels of discount factors impact on the behavior of agents towards
maintenance, a direct one and an indirect one. In our model, the higher the
agent’s discount factor, the larger is her desired level of maintenance. This
is the direct channel. But at the same time, the richer the agent, the larger
is her desired level of maintenance. It is well-known that only agents with
a high discount factor have positive savings in the long run. Those with a
low discount factor save nothing. Thus, the former will become wealthy in
the long run and desire high levels of environmental maintenance, while the
latter will become poorer and desire lower levels of maintenance. This is
the indirect channel. This provides us with new insights about the relation-
ship between economic development and environmental quality through the
voting equilibrium (a new rationale for the so-called Environmental Kuznets
Curve, see e.g. Dasgupta et al. (2002), Prieur (2009)). We also show (among
other results) that, when the median voter is patient, then a lower inequality
among agents has a positive effect on the environmental quality.
This discussion also relates to the broad debate about the discounting
rate in environmental economics.2 Even if discounting is often considered in
the literature as a normative issue, it also has a positive content, as stressed
by Dasgupta: “discount rates on consumption changes combine values with
facts. (Dasgupta, 2008, p. 144) or by Arrow et al. (1995) who distinguishes
prescriptive and descriptive positions. In environmental economics, a high
discount rate implies relatively modest and slow environmental maintenance,
while a low discount rate implies immediate and strong action. The common
characteristics of all this literature is to rely on the assumption that there
exists a representative agent in the economy whose preferences are considered
2Recently this debate has experienced a strong revival after the publication of the
Stern Review (Stern, 2006, and Stern, 2008). Prominent economists have contributed to
the debate, like Dasgupta (2008), Nordhaus (2008) or Weitzman (2007).
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as given by a benevolent social planner. This agent further acts as a benevo-
lent social planner3. We depart from the representative agent hypothesis by
considering an economy populated with heterogeneous agents. Then, we are
able to provide a microeconomic rationale to determine the implicit global
discount rate in this economy. This departs from the normative discussion on
what the discount rate should be. In our analysis, we take beforehand agents’
preferences, and we scrutinize how the existence of heterogeneity shapes the
policy in the global economy. This is a novel contribution to the debate on
discounting based on a positive approach.
Applying the median voter theorem to dynamic models requires a suitable
analytical redesign of the political settings in this model. Models of such a
kind are much harder to analyze than their static counterparts or than the
usual intertemporal models without political ingredients. It appears from the
recent literature that the analysis of the performance of majoritarian settings
in dynamic frameworks has attracted growing interest, see e.g. Baron (1996),
Krusell et al. (1997), Cooley and Soares (1999), Rangel (2001) and Bernheim
and Slavov (2009). The stage of development of the theory is still in its
infancy, and there is no consensus about how to model dynamic majoritarian
voting. Without going into detail in this introduction, it should be stressed
that our approach to voting is different from the approaches used in the
above-mentioned papers. We propose a novel definition of voting equilibrium,
which is related to Kramer-Shepsles equilibrium concept (Kramer (1972),
Shepsle (1979)). This definition will allow us to provide new theoretical
results about voting equilibrium in a dynamical setting.
These results bring us to our last discussion on alternative financing
schemes of the environmental maintenance. We look at the different impacts
on heterogenous households and especially on the median voter, of financing
maintenance both with taxes and with issuance of public bonds. We show
that, under common assumption about income distribution, an increase in
the public debt leads to a lower environmental quality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model,
define the competitive equilibria and describe steady-state equilibria for a
given policy. In Section 3 we endogenize the voting procedure on environ-
mental maintenance, define the intertemporal and steady state voting equi-
libria, and show the logical consistency between the median voter theorem
and the voting equilibrium in dynamic general equilibrium. In Section 4 the
comparison with the representative agent framework is proposed. In Section
5 we perform some comparative statics exercises to determine under which
circumstances environmental quality is positively impacted by an increase in
3Or the social evaluator, to take Dasgupta’s words.
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total factor productivity, an increase in patience, and a decrease in inequal-
ity. The discussion about the impact of public debt on the environmental
quality is carried out in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The model, and preliminary results
Our objective in this paper is to define and to study the intertemporal com-
petitive equilibria with voting on maintenance. We define voting equilibria
in two steps. In this section, we do the first step, namely we determine
the competitive equilibrium production and consumption paths for a given
maintenance. In the next section, we will do the second step, namely we will
select, in the class of these competitive equilibria, the ones in which there is
also a voting equilibrium.
The framework of analysis used in this paper is the one with infinitely-
lived consumers, supplying inelastically each time one unit of labor and with
a representative globally polluting firm.
2.1 Production and pollution
Output is determined by means of a neoclassical production function
F (Kt, Lt) = Lf(kt), where Kt and Lt are capital and labor at time t,
kt = Kt/L is capital intensity, f(k) = F (k, 1) is the production function
in intensive form. Capital is assumed to depreciate completely within the
period. Output can be used for consumption, investment or maintenance.
Thus, the dynamics of capital is given by
Kt+1 = F (Kt, Lt)− Ct −Mt,
where Ct is time t aggregate consumption and Mt is time t aggregate main-
tenance.
Pollution (the emissions level) at time t, Pt, is proportional to output:
Pt = λF (Kt, L) = λLf(kt), λ > 0. (1)
We denote by Qt an index of environmental quality at time t and by Mt
the maintenance of environmental quality. The dynamics of Qt is given by
Qt+1 = Ψ(Qt − Pt + Mt
µ
), (2)
where Ψ : R+ → R+ is a concave increasing function, µ > 0 is exogenously
given coefficient. Since “marginal environmental productivity” of mainte-
nance, ∂Qt+1/∂Mt = Ψ
′(·)/µ, is negatively influenced by µ, we can interpret
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1/µ as the environmental efficiency of maintenance. By Q¯ we denote a unique
positive solution to the following equation: Ψ(Q) = Q, i.e. the stationary
value of environmental quality in the case with no pollution and no main-
tenance. For example, the following particular forms of Ψ(X) can be used:
Ψ(X) = XνQ¯1−ν , with 0 < ν < 1, or Ψ(X) = νX+(1−ν)Q¯, with 0 < ν < 1.
Let Φ(·) = Ψ−1(·). We can rewrite (2) as follows:
µΦ(Qt+1) = µ(Qt − Pt) +Mt.
It should be noted that µΦ′(Q) can be interpreted as the marginal cost of
quality improvement.
The representative firm maximizes its profit pit under the constraint of
the technology F (Kt, Lt) by choosing its preferred volumes of capital Kt and
labor Lt, considering the real wage and interest rates, wt and rt, as given.
The firm’s problem is summarized as follows:
max
Kt,Lt
pit = F (Kt, Lt)− (1 + rt)Kt − wtLt, (3)
and admits the following first-order conditions: F ′K(Kt, Lt) = 1 + rt and
F ′L(Kt, Lt) = wt, or in intensive terms: f
′(kt) = 1 + rt and f(kt)− f ′(kt)kt =
wt.
2.2 Consumers
Population consists of L consumers. Each consumer is endowed with one unit
of labor force. For simplicity, L is integer and odd. The objective function
of consumer i is ∞∑
t=0
βti [u(ct) + v(Qt)],
where ct is his consumption at time t, βi is his discount factor. We assume
that u(c) and v(Q) satisfy the following conditions:
u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0, u′(0) =∞, v′(Q) > 0, v′′(Q) < 0, v′(0) =∞.
Each consumer i is patient (βi = β
h) or impatient (βi = β
l), 0 < βl < βh < 1.
We denote by Hh the set of patient consumers (with discount factor equal to
βh) and by Hl the set of impatient consumers (those with β
l).
Each consumer pays a tax mt = Mt/L to finance the public provision
of environmental maintenance and the budget constraints of a consumer at
time t are
ct + st +mt ≤ wt + (1 + rt)st−1, (4)
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ct ≥ 0, st ≥ 0,
where wt is the wage rate rt is the interest rate and st are her savings con-
sumer at time t. It should be emphasized that consumers are forbidden to
borrow against their future labor income and hence their savings must be
non-negative.
The consumer’s utility depends both on variables on which he has full
control, ct and st, and on the variable mt which is determined by the voting
procedure, yet to be introduced. Thus, before analyzing the result of the
voting procedure, solving the consumer’s objective is equivalent to choosing
the optimal values of ct and st, ∀t, considering mt as given.
Suppose that at time τ consumer i is given his predetermined level of
savings sˆiτ−1, the predetermined level of environmental quality Qˆτ , the stream
of pollution (Pt)
∞
t=τ and some maintenance policy which is represented by a
sequence m = (mt)
∞
t=0 of non-negative numbers. Then the problem of this
consumer is
P1(τ) =

max(ct)+∞t=τ ,(st)+∞t=τ ,(Qt)+∞t=τ
∑∞
t=τ β
t
i [u(ct) + v(Qt)],
subject to
µΦ(Qt+1) = µ(Qt − Pt) + Lmt, t = τ, τ + 1, . . . ,
ct + st +mt ≤ wt + (1 + rt)st−1, t = τ, τ + 1, . . . ,
sτ−1 = sˆiτ−1, Qτ = Qˆτ ,
ct ≥ 0, st ≥ 0, t = τ, τ + 1, . . . .

It should be noticed that since m = (mt)
∞
t=0 is given, the sequence (Qt)
+∞
t=τ
is in fact predetermined by Qˆτ and m. Hence, the utility consumer i derives
from environmental quality,
∑∞
t=τ β
t
iv(Qt), does not depend on her choice,
though, formally, Qt is a control variable in problem P1(τ).
2.3 Competitive equilibrium paths and steady-state
equilibria
Now we can give the definition of the equilibrium path supposing that the
environmental policy is given and that no agent can change it.
Let at time 0 the environmental policy be represented by some se-
quence m = (mt)
∞
t=0 of non-negative numbers be given. Let an initial state
{(sˆi−1)Li=1, kˆ0, Qˆ0} also be given. Here sˆi−1 ≥ 0 are the initial savings of
consumers i = 1, . . . , L, kˆ0 > 0 is the initial per capita stock of capital,∑L
i=1 sˆ
i
−1 = Lkˆ0, and Qˆ0 > 0 is the initial value of environmental quality.
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Definition 1. Competitive equilibrium path
Given m, the sequence Em = {k∗t , 1 + r∗t , w∗t , (si∗t−1, ci∗t )Li=1, P ∗t , Q∗t}∞t=0 is
called a competitive equilibrium path starting from {(sˆi−1)Li=1, kˆ0, Qˆ0} if
1. capital and labor markets clear at the following prices: 1 + rt =
1 + r∗t = f
′(k∗t ), wt = w
∗
t = f(k
∗
t )− f ′(k∗t )k∗t , t = 0, 1, . . . ;
2. for each household i = 1, . . . , L the sequence (si∗t−1, c
i∗
t , Q
∗
t )
∞
t=0 is a
solution to problem P1(0) at 1 + rt = 1 + r∗t , wt = w∗t , t = 0, 1, . . . ;
3.
∑L
i=1 s
i∗
t−1 = Lk
∗
t , t = 0, 1, . . . ;
4. P ∗t = λLf(k
∗
t ), t = 0, 1, . . . ;
5. µΦ(Q∗t+1) = µ(Q
∗
t − P ∗t ) + Lmt, t = 0, 1, . . . .
Notice that, at each time t, maintenance mt is given and smaller than
the wage rate wt. We will not discuss the existence of equilibrium paths.
Our main emphasis will be made on steady-state equilibria. Reasonably, we
define steady-state equilibria under the assumption that the environmental
policy is given and constant over time.
Definition 2. Competitive steady state equilibrium
Let an m ≥ 0 be given and let m = (mt)∞t=0, with mt = m, t =
0, 1, . . . . We call a tuple Em = {k∗, 1 + r∗, w∗, (si∗, ci∗)Li=1, P ∗, Q∗}
a competitive steady-state equilibrium if the sequence {k∗t , 1 +
r∗t , w
∗
t , (s
i∗
t−1, c
i∗
t )
L
i=1, P
∗
t , Q
∗
t}∞t=0 given for all t = 0, 1, . . . by
k∗t = k
∗, 1 + r∗t = 1 + r
∗, w∗t = w
∗, (5)
(si∗t−1, c
i∗
t )
L
i=1 = (s
i∗, ci∗)Li=1, (6)
P ∗t = P
∗, Q∗t = Q
∗. (7)
is an equilibrium path starting from the initial state {(sˆi−1)Li=1, kˆ0, Qˆ0} =
{(si∗)Li=1, k∗, Q∗}. 
The following proposition describing the structure of steady-state equilib-
ria is an adaptation to our model of the well-known results by Becker (1980,
2006).
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Proposition 1. Structure of steady state equilibrium
A tuple Em = {k∗, 1 + r∗, w∗, (si∗, ci∗)Li=1, P ∗, Q∗} satisfying m < w∗ is a
steady-state equilibrium if and only if
βh =
1
1 + r∗
, 1 + r∗ = f ′(k∗), w∗ = f(k∗)− f ′(k∗)k∗, (8)
P ∗ = λLf(k∗), (9)
µΦ(Q∗) = µ(Q∗ − P ∗) + Lm, (10)
si∗ = 0, i ∈ Hl, (11)
si∗ ≥ 0, i ∈ Hh, (12)
L∑
i=1
si∗ =
∑
i∈Hh
si∗ = Lk∗; (13)
c∗ + s∗ +m = w∗ + (1 + r∗)s∗. (14)
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
In this proposition, equation (8) shows that the steady-state capital inten-
sity, interest rate, and the wage rate are determined by the discount factor of
the patient consumer. Equations (11)-(12) tell us that impatient consumers
have zero savings. It means that all the capital is own by patient consumers.
As a consequence, in a steady-state equilibrium all impatient consumers are
identical in terms of income and savings. In contrast, the distribution of sav-
ings among patient consumers is indeterminate in a steady state equilibrium.
As shown by equation (13), only aggregate savings is determined.
3 Voting equilibria
There is no reason for heterogenous agents to agree on the desired level of en-
vironmental maintenance. One way to solve this disagreement is to choose it
by majority voting. If the level of maintenance is to be determined by major-
ity voting, which level will be chosen? If policy choices were one-dimensional,
we would refer to the median voter theorem, but in our intertemporal model
this theorem cannot be applied directly since, formally speaking, in such
models policy choices are multi-dimensional.
However, if we constraint our consideration to steady states, median voter
approach to decision-making seems to be quite reasonable. At the same time,
we should not mistakenly think that mere consideration of steady states
10
only makes policy choices one-dimensional. Fortunately, as we show in this
section, for some reasonable definition of voting equilibrium, in a voting
steady-state equilibrium the level of maintenance will be chosen just by the
median voter.
Let m = (mt)
∞
t=0 be an environmental policy. The optimal value of prob-
lem P1(τ) for consumer i is a function of sˆτ−1, Qˆτ and m. We will denote
this optimal value by Vi,τ (sˆτ−1, Qˆτ ,m).
Definition 3. Preferred change in maintenance
Suppose that the environmental policy is represented by some sequence
m¯ = (m¯t)
∞
t=0 of non-negative numbers and that at m = m¯ the function
Vi,τ (sˆτ−1, Qˆτ ,m) is differentiable in mτ . We say that consumer i is in
favor of increasing mτ if
∂Vi,τ (sˆτ−1,Qˆτ ,m)
∂mτ
> 0 and is in favor of decreasing
mτ if
∂Vi,τ (sˆτ−1,Qˆτ ,m)
∂mτ
< 0 and m¯τ > 0. 
Let us assume that, for an equilibrium path
Em¯ = {k∗t , 1 + r∗t , w∗t , (si∗t−1, ci∗t )Li=1, P ∗t , Q∗t}∞t=0
the function Vi,τ (s
∗
τ−1, Q
∗
τ ,m) is differentiable in mτ at m = m¯. We denote
by N+τ (Em¯) the number of consumers who are in favor of increasing m¯τ , and
by N−τ (Em¯) the number of consumers who are in favor of decreasing m¯τ .
Now we are ready to define intertemporal voting equilibria.
Definition 4. Intertemporal voting equilibrium
Let m∗ = (m∗t )
∞
t=0 be a maintenance policy and Em∗ be an equilibrium
path constructed at this policy. We call the couple (m∗, Em∗) an intertem-
poral voting equilibrium path if at m = m∗ ∀τ = 0, 1, . . . the function
Vi,τ (s
∗
τ−1, Q
∗
τ ,m) is differentiable in mτ , and
N+τ (Em
∗
) <
L
2
, N−τ (Em
∗
) <
L
2
, ∀τ = 0, 1, . . . .

This definition is in line with the usual way of defining intertemporal equi-
librium, as articulated by Hicks (1937) and, more recently, by Grandmond
(1983). In our model, any intertemporal voting equilibrium can be seen as a
sequence of temporary voting equilibria in which agents correctly anticipate
the whole future, including voting results. Indeed, let (m∗, Em∗) be an in-
tertemporal voting equilibrium. Suppose that at time τ the agents are asked
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to vote on mτ and that they correctly anticipate m
∗
t for all t = τ+1, τ+2, ....
Then it is clear that all the conditions for the median voter theorem hold
in this one-dimensional voting, and that the preferred value of mτ for the
median voter coincides with m∗τ . A key implication is that intertemporal
voting equilibria are time consistent.
In the rest of the paper we shall focus on steady state voting equilib-
ria. Consider a couple (m∗, Em
∗
), where m∗ ≥ 0 and Em∗ = {k∗, 1 +
r∗, w∗, (si∗, ci∗)Li=1, P
∗, Q∗} is a steady-state equilibrium constructed at the
maintenance policy m∗ = (m∗0,m
∗
1, ...), m
∗
t = m
∗, t = 0, 1, .... Let Em∗ be an
equilibrium path corresponding to Em
∗
.
Definition 5. Steady state voting equilibrium
We call the couple (m∗, Em
∗
) a steady state voting equilibrium if the
couple (m∗, Em∗) is an intertemporal voting equilibrium path. 
To answer the question of whether a couple (m∗, Em
∗
) is a steady state
voting equilibrium or not it is sufficient to know which consumers are in
favor of increasing of m∗0 = m
∗ at time 0 and which ones are in favor of its
decreasing.
We know that for each i the sequence (s˜it−1, c˜
i
t, Q˜t)
∞
t=0 given by
s˜it−1 = s
i∗, c˜it = c
i∗, Q˜t = Q∗, (15)
is a solution to
max
(ct)
+∞
t=0 ,(Qt)
+∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
βti [u(ct) + v(Qt)], (16)
µΦ(Qt+1) = µ(Qt − P ∗) + Lm∗t , t = 0, 1, . . . , (17)
ct + st +m
∗
t ≤ w∗ + (1 + r∗)st−1, t = 0, 1, . . . , (18)
si−1 = sˆ
i
−1, Q0 = Qˆ0, (19)
ct ≥ 0, st ≥ 0, Qt ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . (20)
at sˆi−1 = s
i∗, Qˆ0 = Q∗.
Lemma 1. Differentiability of value function w.r.t. mainte-
nance and sign of derivative
Let for some i the sequence (s˜it−1, c˜
i
t, Q˜t)
∞
t=0 given by (15) be a solution
to problem (16)-(20) at given m∗t = m
∗ ∈ [0, w∗), t = 0, 1, ... and at
sˆi−1 = s
i∗, Qˆ0 = Q∗. Then Vi,0(si∗, Q∗,m∗) is differentiable in m∗0 and
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∂Vi,0(s
i∗, Q∗,m∗)
∂m∗0
T 0⇔ βiLv′(Q∗) T µu′(ci∗)(Φ′(Q∗)− βi). (21)
Proof. See appendix A.2 
The interpretation of Lemma 1 runs as follows. Consider the first inequality
of equation (21) at a given maintenance m∗0 and suppose that the left-hand
side is higher than the right-hand side . In this case, out of a marginal change
in maintenance, the induced marginal utility of environmental quality, i.e.
the LHS of equation (21), is larger than the induced marginal utility of
consumption, i.e. the RHS of (21). This is likely to happen when the given
maintenance level m∗0 is low. This entails that the consumer is in favor of
an increase in maintenance. In the opposite case, the given maintenance m∗0
is likely to be large so that the induced marginal utility of consumption is
higher than the induced marginal utility of quality and the consumer is in
favor of decreasing maintenance.
To check whether a couple (m∗, Em
∗
) is a voting steady-state equilib-
rium or not, consider the following problem in which household i is free to
determine her preferred level of maintenance mt:
P2 =

max(ct)+∞t=0 ,(st)
+∞
t=0 ,(mt)
+∞
t=0 ,(Qt)
+∞
t=0
∑∞
t=0 β
t
i [u(ct) + v(Qt)],
subject to
µΦ(Qt+1) ≤ µ(Qt − P ∗) + Lmt, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
ct + st +mt ≤ w∗ + (1 + r∗)st−1, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
s−1 = sˆ−1, Q0 = Qˆ0,
ct ≥ 0, st ≥ 0, mt ≥ 0, Qt ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . .

We say that (s˜, c˜, m˜, Q˜) ∈ R4+ determines a steady-state solution to this
problem if the sequence (s˜t−1, c˜t, m˜t, Q˜t)∞t=0 given by
s˜t−1 = s˜, c˜t = c˜, m˜t = m˜, Q˜t = Q˜ (22)
is its solution at sˆ−1 = s˜ and Qˆ0 = Q˜.
Prior to formulating the following lemma, remind that βh(1+r∗) = 1 and
hence that βi(1 + r
∗) < 1, ∀i ∈ Hl, and βi(1 + r∗) = 1,∀i ∈ Hh.
Lemma 2. Characterization of steady state solution to P2
The tuple (s˜, c˜, m˜, Q˜) ∈ R4+ determines a steady-state solution to P2 if
and only if
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βi(1 + r
∗) < 1⇒ s˜ = 0 (23)
βiLv
′(Q˜) ≤ µu′(c˜)(Φ′(Q˜)− βi) (= if m˜ > 0) (24)
c˜ = w∗ + r∗s˜− m˜ (25)
µ(Φ(Q˜)− Q˜+ P ∗) = Lm˜ (26)
Proof. See appendix A.3. 
To simplify the presentation we can get rid of m˜ by noticing that m˜ >
0 ⇔ c˜ < w∗ + r∗s˜ and rewriting conditions (24)-(25) as follows:
c˜ = (w∗ + r∗s˜− µ
L
P ∗) +
µ
L
(Q˜− Φ(Q˜)), (27)
c˜ ≤ w∗ + r∗s˜, (28)
βiLv
′(Q˜) ≤ µu′(c˜)(Φ′(Q˜)− βi) (= if c˜ < w∗ + r∗s˜). (29)
Equation βiLv
′(Q) = µu′(c)(Φ′(Q)−βi) implies an increasing dependence of
c on Q. As for equation c = (w∗ + r∗s˜− µ
L
P ∗) + µ
L
(Q−Φ(Q)), for any given
s˜, it specifies a dependence of c on Q which is simply decreasing, or is first
increasing (Φ′(Q) < 1) and then decreasing (Φ′(Q) > 1).
Suppose we are given m∗ ∈ [0, w∗), where w∗ is given by (8). Let Em∗ =
{k∗, 1 + r∗, w∗, (si∗, ci∗)Li=1, P ∗, Q∗} be a steady-state equilibrium constructed
at the maintenance policy m∗ = (m∗,m∗, ...). Put all households in ascending
order of their savings and take the median one, im.
4 Lemmas 1 and 2 lead
to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Steady state voting equilibrium and median voter
The couple (m∗, Em
∗
) is a steady-state voting equilibrium if and only if
for i = im, the tuple (s
i∗, ci∗,m∗, Q∗) is a steady-state solution to problem
P2. 
This theorem reads that, in the long-run, the capital stock depends on
the discount factor of the patient households, while maintenance and en-
vironmental quality depend on the median discount factor and the median
savings.
4More formally, we can put the set of households in an order such that, if βi < βj and
if si∗ < sj∗, then i precedes j. Such an order exists because the impatient consumers do
not save in a steady-state equilibrium. Now take the household median in the sense of the
introduced order, im.
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Figure 1: Left: Zero-Maintenance Equilibrium (Regime 1) - Right: Positive
Maintenance Equilibrium (Regime 2)
It follows from this theorem that, in equilibrium, there exist two possible
cases, depending on whether cim∗ = w∗ + r∗sim∗ (⇔ m∗ = 0) or cim∗ <
w∗ + r∗sim∗ (⇔ m∗ > 0). They are illustrated by the left and right panel of
Fig. 1, on which we take sim∗ as given. On these graphs the three curves C1,
C2 and C3 are defined as follows:
Curve C1 : βimLv′(Q) = µu′(c)(Φ′(Q)− βim) (30)
Curve C2 : c = w∗ + r∗sim∗ (31)
Curve C3 : c = (w∗ + r∗sim∗ − µ
L
P ∗) +
µ
L
(Q− Φ(Q)) (32)
Let us describe more precisely these two regimes:
Regime 1 - Zero-maintenance. The equilibrium point (Q∗, cim∗) is at the
intersection of the C2 curve and the C3 curve (see figure 1a) and, as far
as curve C1 is concerned, we have βimLv′(Q∗) < µu′(cim∗)(Φ′(Q∗)−βim).
Regime 2 - Positive-maintenance. The equilibrium point (Q∗, cim∗) is at
the intersection of the C1 curve with the C3 curve (see figure 1b) and,
as far as curve C2 is concerned, we have cim∗ < w∗ + r∗sim∗ .
In combination with the above-mentioned two regimes (m∗ > 0 and m∗ =
0), two cases must be distinguished:
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Case 1 - Impatient median voter: βim = β
l and savings of the median
voter are determined uniquely, sim∗ = 0.
Case 2 - Patient median voter: βim = β
h and the savings of the median
voter, sim∗, are not determined uniquely; they can take any value in
the interval [0, 2
L+1
Lk∗].
In both cases, the regime of equilibrium maintenance can be nil or pos-
itive. In Case 1, the equilibrium levels of maintenance and environmental
quality are determined uniquely. As for Case 2, if there exists at least one
equilibrium with positive maintenance, the equilibrium levels of maintenance
and environmental quality are indeterminate since there is a continuum of
these.
Several words on the existence of steady-state voting equilibria are in
order. It is clear that if the majority of consumers is impatient, then steady-
state voting equilibria exist for any distribution of savings among patient
consumers because in this case the solution to problem P2 for the median
voter, (s˜, c˜, m˜, Q˜), unconditionally satisfies m˜ < w∗. If if the majority of
consumers is patient, steady-state voting equilibria exists for any distribution
of savings among patient consumers where the savings of the median voter
are nil or sufficiently small.
However, if the majority of consumers is patient, and the savings of the
median voter are sufficiently high, it may be that she will vote for mainte-
nance which exceeds the wage rate and hence steady-state equilibrium does
not exist.
4 How agents’ heterogeneity shapes environ-
mental maintenance
In this section we compare the level of environmental quality in voting steady-
state equilibria of our model with that in steady-state equilibria of a similar
economy populated with identical agents. We constraint our consideration
to the case where the equilibrium values of capital stock and hence output is
the same in both models. The question we raise is the following: what is the
effect of agents’ heterogeneity in discount factor and wealth on environmental
maintenance when agents are asked to vote?5
5Note that this is different from the question raised by Caselli and Ventura (2000) :
under which condition does a model with heterogenous agents “admits” a representative
agent model, namely a model with homogenous agents displaying the same aggregate and
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We will identify the homogenous population model as a particular case
of our model where the discount factors of all consumers are the same and
equal to βh. Moreover, by steady-state equilibria in the homogenous popu-
lation model we will mean symmetrical voting steady-state equilibria in this
particular case of our model i.e. equilibria where the savings of all consumers
are the same and hence consumption of all agents is the same. To be pre-
cise, for symmetrical equilibria voting is somewhat irrelevant because in such
equilibria voting is unanimous.
Let {k∗S, 1 + r∗S, w∗S, (si∗S , ci∗S )Li=1, PS∗, QS∗} be a symmetric steady-state
voting equilibrium of our model with βi = β
h, i = 1, . . . , L,, and
{k∗, 1 + r∗, w∗, (si∗, ci∗)Li=1, P ∗, Q∗} be a steady-state voting equilibrium in
our model with arbitrarily chosen discount factors. By symmetric we mean
that s1∗S = . . . = s
L∗
S . It should be noticed that
k∗S = k
∗, r∗S = r
∗, w∗S = w
∗
and that, by assumption,
si∗S = k
∗, i = 1, . . . , L.
The last equation says that the savings of agents in the symmetric steady-
state voting equilibrium with βi = β
h, i = 1, . . . , L, are equal to the mean of
the savings in the model in the heterogeneous agent case. We assume that
in the former model the discount factor shared by all consumer is βh but
not βl, because otherwise equilibrium stocks of capital and output would be
different in the two models.
Let
m∗ = w∗ + r∗sim∗ − cim∗,
m∗S = w
∗
S + r
∗
Sk
∗
S − c∗S(= w∗ + r∗k∗ − c∗S),
where c∗S = c
1∗
S (= . . . = c
L∗
S ).
The following proposition can be proved by means of the argument anal-
ogous to those in the previous section.
Proposition 2. Homogenous vs. heterogeneous population equi-
libria
average behavior. Indeed, in our case, by assumption, we fix capital intensity to be the
same in both models. On the other hand we do not fix maintenance, nor do we look at
the representative agent version of the model which would yield the same maintenance.
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1) Suppose that βim = β
l and hence sim∗ = 0 in the heterogenous agent
economy. In this case:
1. if m∗S = 0, then m
∗ = 0 and Q∗ = Q∗S;
2. if m∗S > 0, then m
∗ < m∗S and Q
∗ < Q∗S.
2) Suppose that βim = β
h in the heterogenous agent economy. In this case:
1. if sim∗ ≤ si∗S = k∗, then:
(a) if m∗S = 0, m
∗ = 0 and Q∗ = Q∗S
(b) if m∗S > 0, m
∗ < m∗S and Q
∗ < Q∗S
2. if sim∗ ≥ si∗S = k∗, then:
(a) if mi∗ = 0, m∗S = 0 and Q
∗ = Q∗S
(b) if m∗ > 0, then m∗ > m∗S and Q
∗ > Q∗S

We will see in the next section that under some reasonable assumptions it
is natural to expect that in less developed countries there is no maintenance
and that it is positive in developed countries. Thus, the above proposition
reads that for less developed countries the predictions of both models are
the same: there is no maintenance in steady-state equilibria irrespective of
whether the median voter is patient or impatient.
For developed countries the predictions of the models differ. If the ma-
jority of agents in our model is impatient, then the equilibrium levels of
maintenance and environmental quality in our model are lower than those
predicted by the homogenous population model. If the majority of agent is
patient, then it is necessary to compare the median saving or income with the
mean ones. If the median savings are lower than the mean, or, equivalently,
the median income is lower then the mean income, then the equilibrium levels
of maintenance and environmental quality in our model are lower that those
in the homogenous population model. Otherwise, the situation is the oppo-
site. The case where the median income is lower than the mean is usually
considered as typical.
Thus our model suggests that, in most cases in the real world, lower levels
of maintenance and environmental quality should be observed than what the
homogenous agents population model would predict.
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5 Some comparative statics on preferences,
income inequality, and technology
As stressed above, if the median voter is patient, in a steady state the savings
of the median voter, sim∗, are not determined uniquely. They can take any
value in the interval [0, 2
L+1
Lk∗]. Therefore when making a comparative
statics exercise we should remember that a change in a parameter will have
an indeterminate effect on the savings of the median voter. To circumvent
this problem, in this section, we first assume that k∗ is kept unchanged wheras
sim∗ changes and then we assume that the ratio sim∗/(
∑L
i=1 s
i∗) and hence
the ratio sim∗/k∗ remain intact when a parameter changes (notice that since
k∗ = (
∑L
i=1 s
i∗)/L shows the mean savings, sim∗/k∗ shows the proportion
between the median and mean savings).
5.1 An increase in sim∗ other things equal
First, we carry out a comparative statics exercise relevant only in Case 2,
where the median voter is patient and, consequently, his savings can be
positive. Assume that k∗ is kept unchanged and sim∗ increases. This means
that the increase in sim∗ reflects a change in the distribution of savings among
the patient consumers only. Consequently, it leads to a another income
distribution (more precisely, an increase in the median income relative to the
mean).
• under Zero-Maintenance Equilibrium (Regime 1), a small increase in
sim∗, other things equal, will shift C2 and C3 upwards by the same
magnitude. Hence, consumption of the median voter cim∗ will increase,
but the environmental quality Q∗ will remain unchanged. A larger
increase in sim∗ may lead the economy to Regime 2.
• under Positive-Maintenance Equilibrium (Regime 2), a small increase
in sim∗, other things equal, will shift C3 upwards, while letting C1 un-
touched. Hence the environmental quality Q∗ will increase.
Following the politico-economic literature about income inequality (see
e.g. Meltzer and Richard (1981)), an income distribution is called more
equal, the higher the median income is relative to the mean (this is only
reasonable in the case where the median income does not exceed the mean,
which is considered as a typical situation). For our model this implies that in
developed economies, where maintenance is positive, lower inequality has a
positive effect on environmental quality, whereas in less developed economies,
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where there is no maintenance, inequality itself does not effect environmental
quality.
5.2 An increase in total factor productivity
In the following sub-sections we shall assume that the production function
is Cobb-Douglas, f(k) = kα, 0 < α < 1, and that the fraction of output
necessary to eliminate emissions is lower than the labor share in output,
1 − α > µλ. Geometrically, the latter assumption implies that the curve C3
shifts upwards after an increase in capital intensity. In the following we will
clearly indicate which of our conclusions rely on this assumption.
Let us first assume an increase in the total factor productivity by intro-
ducing a scale parameter a in the production function, which one becomes
aF (K,L) = Laf(k), where a represents the total factor productivity. The
impact of an increase in total factor productivity will depend on the regime
the economy follows in equilibrium.
Regime 1. Zero-maintenance Equilibrium
In this regime, a small increase in a will lead to an increase in k∗, w∗
and w∗ + r∗sim∗. Hence, it will also increase the output level Lf(k∗) and
pollution P ∗ but will not make maintenance positive. As a consequence,
the environmental quality Q∗ will decrease. Graphically (see Figure 2, left
panel), C2 will shift upwards due to the increase in w∗ + r∗sim∗. C3 will also
shift upwards, but to a smaller extent, since both w∗ and P ∗ increase. If the
increase in a becomes too large, then the economy switches to Regime 2, the
Positive-maintenance Equilibrium.
Regime 2. Positive-maintenance Equilibrium
In that regime an increase in a will shift C3 upwards, as shown in Figure
2, right panel, and hence to an increase in Q∗ (this is not necessarily true if
Assumption A does not fulfil).
To sum up, if the economy starts under Regime 1, then an increase in a
from 0 to +∞ first leads to a decrease in the environmental quality Q∗, and
then to an increase, as shown in Figure 2. If one considers that less developed
countries most likely correspond to Regime 1 and wealthy countries to Regime
2, then this conclusion means that technological progress first goes with a
decrease in environmental quality, and after some stage of development to an
increase in environmental quality. This result provides a new rationale for
an Environmental Kuznets Curve (see e.g. Stockey, 1998, Dasgupta et al.
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Figure 2: An increase in total factor productivity in Regime 1 (Left) and
Regime 2 (Right)
(2002) or Prieur (2009)) to exist in the presence of heterogeneous consumers
and voting.
Let us now turn to two comparative statics related to households’ prefer-
ences.
5.3 Patient agents become more patient: an increase
in βh
We first consider an increase in βh, meaning that patient agents become even
more patient. The effects on the environmental quality will depend on which
regime the economy experiences.
Under Zero-Maintenance Equilibrium (Regime 1), a small increase in βh
leads to an increase in capital intensity k∗, wage rate w∗, output Lf(k∗) and
pollution P ∗, but it cannot make maintenance positive. Hence Q∗ decreases
as βh increases under Regime 1. Graphically (see Fig. 2, left panel), C2 shifts
upwards due to the increase in w∗; C3 also shifts upwards, but to a smaller
extent (w∗ will increase but P ∗ will also increase). If moreover the median
voter is patient, Case 2, then, C1 shifts to the right. As a consequence
the economy may switch the economy to the Positive-maintenance regime
(regime 2).
Under Positive-Maintenance Equilibrium (Regime 2, see Fig. 2b) an in-
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crease in βh will lead to an upward shift of C3 and, in Case 2, to a shift
of C1 to the right. Hence Q∗ will increase (this is not necessarily true if
Assumption A does not fulfil).
5.4 Impatient agents become less impatient: an in-
crease in βl
Now, let us consider an increase in βl, which means that impatient agents
become less impatient. The effect on Q∗ will depend on whether the median
consumer is impatient or patient, what we referred to as Case 1 and Case 2,
respectively.
In the case where the median voter is impatient (Case 1, βim = β
l), then
the two regimes must be considered.
• under Zero-Maintenance Equilibrium (Regime 1), a small increase in
βl does not change k∗, w∗, Lf(k∗) or P ∗. It neither changes Q∗. This
case results in a shift of C1 to the right, as illustrated in Fig. 3. Still,
if the increase in βl becomes large enough, then the economy switches
to Regime 2;
• under Positive-Maintenance Equilibrium (Regime 2), a small increase
in βl does not change k∗, w∗, Lf(k∗) or P ∗, but it does increase Q∗, as
illustrated in Fig. 3.
In the case where the median voter is patient (Case 2, βim = β
h), then it
is clear that changing βl has no effect on Q∗.
6 Debt-financed versus tax-financed mainte-
nance policy
We now turn to the analysis of some alternative policy scenarios. Up to now
we assumed that the maintenance expenditure was financed by a a pay-as-
you-go tax τt. Such a scheme is called tax-finance. A debt-finance scheme
would mean that the government can also issue public bonds to finance its
expenditure. It is of interest for our approach since heterogenous households
are likely to be hit differently by the taxes needed to finance public debt
and by the interest earned on public bonds. The median voter could thus
be changed in this alternative scenario. On the side of the government, fi-
nancing environmental maitenance to a lesser extent by taxes may be a way
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Figure 3: Impatient agents become less impatient
to increase acceptability of its abatement policy. Moreover, the introduction
of public debt in our infinitely-lived agent model has no impact on the equi-
librium steady state capital intensity, so that we can focus on its impact on
environmental quality.
In this section we shall assume that the government can both raise the
voted taxe τt and issue new one-period public bonds dt+1 to finance main-
tenance mt. As a result, an additional expenses appears in its budget con-
straint, namely the repayment of interests and principal of public bonds. It
is also assumed that public bonds and physical capital are perfect substitute
and bear the same interest rate rt.
Let dt ≥ 0 be the per capita public debt and τt ≥ 0 be the lump-sum tax
at time t. These must satisfy the following government budget constraint:
τt + dt+1 = mt + (1 + rt)dt.
The budget constraint of a consumer (4) now becomes:
ct + st + τt ≤ wt + (1 + rt)st−1, st ≥ 0.
One can easily modify the definitions of competitive equilibrium path for this
case. The only thing deserving attention is that condition 3 (equilibrium on
the capital market) now becomes
L∑
i=1
si∗t−1 = L(k
∗
t + dt), t = 0, 1, . . . .
23
Suppose that public debt is constant over time, dt = d, t = 0, 1, . . .. Then
we can naturally define competitive steady-state equilibrium. Consider such
an equilibrium, (m∗, Em
∗
), where Em
∗
= {k∗, 1 + r∗, w∗, (si∗, ci∗)Li=1, P ∗, Q∗}.
As in Mankiw (2000), government debt does not affect the steady-state cap-
ital stock and national income. Namely, as in the case with no government
debt,
βh =
1
1 + r∗
, 1 + r∗ = f ′(k∗), w∗ = f(k∗)− f ′(k∗)k∗.
At the same time, government debt does influence the distribution of in-
come. A higher level of debt means a higher level of taxation to pay for the
interest payments on the debt. The taxes fall on both patient and impatient
consumers, but the interest payments go entirely to the patient consumers
because only patient consumers save in a steady-state equilibrium.
In the steady-state equilibrium the budget constraint of the government
becomes
τt + d = m
∗ + (1 + r∗)d.
Hence, τt = τ(d), t = 0, 1, . . . , where
τ(d) = m∗ + r∗d.
Therefore, the budget constraint of a consumer in the steady-state equilib-
rium is as follows:
ct + st ≤ w∗ − τ(d) + (1 + r∗)st−1, st ≥ 0.
If the median voter is impatient, in a steady-state equilibrium we have
sim∗ = 0 and hence
cim∗ +m∗ = w∗ − r∗d.
Therefore, for the median voter, an increase in d is practically equivalent
to a decrease in the post-tax wage rate. It follows that in the case where
maintenance is positive, m∗ > 0, if the majority of agents is impatient, an
increase in public debt unambiguously leads to a decrease in maintenance and
environmental quality in the voting steady-state equilibrium.
If the median voter is patient, in a steady state the savings of the me-
dian voter, sim∗, are not determined uniquely and hence a change in d will
have an indeterminate effect on the savings of the median voter. Let us as-
sume that the ratio sim∗/(
∑L
i=1 s
i∗) does not change. Since, in equilibrium,
(
∑L
i=1 s
i∗)/L = k∗ + d, this implies that the ratio γ = sim∗/(k∗ + d), which
shows the proportion between the median and the mean savings, stays un-
changed. Under this assumption, the parameter γ plays the crucial role,
because in this case in a steady-state voting equilibrium we have
cim∗ +m∗ = w∗ + r∗sim∗ − r∗d = w∗ + r∗(γk∗ + (γ − 1)d).
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It is clear that an increase in d leads to a decrease in cim∗+m∗, if γ < 1, and
to an increase in cim∗ +m∗, if γ > 1.
Thus, in the case where maintenance is positive, m∗ > 0, if the median
savings and income are lower than the mean (γ < 1), an increase in public
debt leads to a decrease in maintenance and environmental quality and if the
median savings and income are higher than the mean (γ > 1), an increase in
public debt results in an increase in maintenance and environmental quality.
As noticed above, the case where the median savings and income are lower
than the mean is usually considered as common.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we assume that the population is exogenously divided into two
groups: one with patient households and the other with impatient house-
holds. The environmental maintenance is voted by the households. We intro-
duce the notion of voting equilibrium, look for steady state voting equilibria
and find that for them the median voter theorem applies. If the majority of
households is impatient the equilibrium levels of maintenance and environ-
mental quality is determined uniquely, but if the majority of households is
patient, there can be a continuum of these.
We fulfil comparative statics analysis for steady state voting equilibria
and show that (i) an increase in total factor productivity may produce ef-
fects described by the Environmental Kuznets Curve, (ii) an increase in the
patience of impatient households may improve the environmental quality if
the median voter is impatient and maintenance positive, (iii) in the case
where the median voter is patient and maintenance is positive, if the me-
dian income is lower than the mean, a decrease in inequality can lead to an
increase in the environmental quality .
We also compare our model with a representative agent economy which
is identified with the particular case of our model where all consumers are
patient and savings are distributed evenly across agents. In the case of impa-
tient median voter, the level of environmental quality predicted by our model
is lower than the one predicted by a representative agent economy. The same
holds true if the median voter is patient but the median income lower that
the mean, which is the common case.
Finally, some policy implications of our model are discussed. In this
purpose we introduce public debt as an alternative source of financing envi-
ronmental maintenance. We show that, if the median income is lower than
the mean, then an increase in public debt leads to a lower environmental
quality in the long run.
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A Appendices
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
It is sufficient to notice that since in a steady-state equilibrium we have
µΦ(Q∗) = µ(Q∗ − P ∗) + Lm¯,
and for each i, the sequence
(s˜it−1, c˜
i
t)
∞
t=0
given by
s˜it−1 = s
i∗, c˜it = c
i∗,
is a solution to
max
∞∑
t=0
βtiu(ct),
28
ct + st ≤ (w∗ − m¯) + (1 + r∗)st−1,
si−1 = s
i∗,
ct ≥ 0, st ≥ 0,
and to refer to Becker (1980, 2006). 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We have:
∂Vi,0(s
i∗, Q∗,m∗)
∂m∗0
=
∂Λi,0(Q
∗,m∗)
∂m∗0
+
∂Γi,t(s
i∗,m∗)
∂m∗0
,
where the functions Λi,0 and Γi,0 are defined as follows:
Λi,0(Q0,m
∗) = max
(Qt)∞t=1
{
∞∑
t=0
βtiv(Qt)
| µΦ(Qt+1) ≤ µ(Qt − P ∗) + Lm∗t , Qt+1 ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . .},
Γi,0(s−1,m∗) = max
(ct)∞t=0,(st)
∞
t=0
{
∞∑
t=0
βtiu(ct)
| ct + st +m∗t ≤ w∗ + (1 + r∗)st−1, ct ≥ 0, st ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . .}.
It is not difficult to check that
∂Λi,0(Q
∗,m∗t )
∂m∗t
= βi
Lv′(Q∗)
µ(Φ′(Q∗)− βi)
and
∂Γi,0(s
i∗,m∗t )
∂m∗t
= −u′(c∗).
Therefore,
∂Vi,0(s
i∗, Q∗,m∗)
∂m∗t
= βi
Lv′(Q∗)
µ(Φ′(Q∗)− βi) − u
′(c∗),
which implies (21). 
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Using a traditional argument (see e.g. McKenzie (1986)) we can prove that
a sequence (s˜t−1, c˜t, m˜t, Q˜t)∞t=0 given by (22) is a steady-state solution to
problem P2 if and only if there exist q and p such that for
pt = βipt−1 = ... = βtip,
qt+1 = βiqt = ... = β
t+1
i q.
the following relationships hold:
βtiu
′(c˜t) = pt,
βtiv
′(Q˜t) + qt+1µ− qtµΦ′(Q˜t) = 0,
(1 + r∗)pt ≤ pt−1(= if s˜t−1 > 0),
qt+1L− pt ≥ 0 (= if m˜t > 0),
qt+1Q˜t + pts˜t−1 →t→∞ 0,
or, equivalently,
u′(c˜) = p,
v′(Q˜) = µq(Φ′(Q˜)− βi),
βi ≤ 1
1 + r∗
(= if s˜ > 0),
βiLq − p ≥ 0 (= if m˜ > 0).
The existence of such q and p is equivalent to conditions (23)-(24). 
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